The Future of the Net?

 

The second part of Carr’s book examines the social, political and economic implications of the continued evolution of Web 2.0. Carr’s analysis offers valuable insight as to the potential changes to our society that may result from this evolution. This part of the book strikes a cautionary note by explaining that the Internet’s triumphant march forward may take society into something less than an information utopia. 

 World Wide Computer: a Break from the Past

In discussing rise of World Wide Computer, Carr touches on two often-discussed elements of this new Web 2.0: Second Life and blogging. Though Carr primarily focuses on the modular nature of these two features, I thought they present an excellent example of the concerns raised in last week’s class regarding the disruption of social communities. Professor Sunstein has raised several valid questions as to whether the Digital Age is leading to increased polarization; Carr echoes these concerns (Pg 160). But there is another potential effect of the rise of the online world: individuals are beginning to identify more and more with their online communities as opposed to their geographic areas. Web 2.0 may indeed lead to some segmentation based on viewpoints and beliefs. However, one cannot discount that the Web enables individuals to overcome one other important barrier: that of geography. This should come as no surprise; past technological advancements have had this dual effect.

 

The rise of Second Life and the proliferation of blogs have created opportunities for individuals to carve out their own private niche in cyberspace. Others who share the personal views or tastes of the individual may congregate around this area (See pg 119-120 for the Mustang Blogger example). Commentators have cited these developments with concern, noting that they may undermine the communal spirit of the early internet (See pg 108-109). Other past advances in technology have also caused decentralization of many aspects of American society. The rise of the automobile certainly diminished the amount of interactions had with one another during the commutes to and from work. Yet there are probably few people who argue that this effect outweighs the benefits that cars brought to society overall. The development of the highway system and the sharp rise in the prevalence of the automobile had two competing effects. It arguably did reduce the number of daily interactions that individuals had with their local communities. Yet it also brought distant communities closer together, enabling Americans to visit parts of the country that previous generations would have gone their whole lives without seeing. The Web brings with it similar effects. While individuals may be segmented according to their favorite web pages and blogs, they are no longer confined to their local media outlets. To use Carr’s Mustang example, aficionados from LA to New York can read and share their common interest, unbound by geography.

Unlike past technological developments, however, in theory, the polarization on the Net has no stopping point. While driving does reduce one’s interaction with other individuals, it stops short of eliminating it completely. This is due to the fact that other activities requiring human interaction were not completely displaced by the car. Thus, the car did not enable a person to eliminate all exposure to potentially divergent viewpoints. The same cannot be said of the Web. As Carr points out, search engines tailor the information they delivers to users based on their search history; in essence this allows individuals to create their own personalized information conduits. (Pg 160-161) In theory, traditional media sources, which do not deliver content specifically tailored to a particular user’s viewpoints, would provide a check on this process. However, as more individuals receive their news online, traditional media sources become less relevant to large sections of the population. (Pg. 152). Thus, unlike the car, the Internet has the capacity to replace the alternative sources of human interaction that could serve to prevent the narrowing of views. As of yet, it is still too early to predict where this process will ultimately lead. However, we may not want to write off quite yet the notion of providing some form of public funding to prevent the “Balkanization” of the distribution of information.

 

Our Domain, but for How Long?

 

Carr does an excellent job pointing out the fact that for the most part, Americans have little problem with the Internet because it is largely under de facto American control (Pg. 182). Unsurprisingly, there is a growing chorus from other countries to establish greater international oversight of the Net on a more inclusive basis (Pg. 183). America has witnessed this type of transformation occur with respect to other institutions that it has founded as well. The United Nations owes its existence  in part  to the US; yet as the past three decades have demonstrated, America’s relationship with its creation has grown somewhat rocky.Carr points out that the perceived US domination of the Internet may lead countries to create rival networks (Pg. 183). Such a move would raise serious concerns. In the first instance, it is highly likely that if each nation were to set up its own national net, there would be a good deal of duplicative systems created with the accompanying wasteful expenditures. In addition, such a move would undoubtedly exacerbate the “Balkanization” of the Internet, but on a national level. Individual countries may be tempted to discriminate against foreign web-based commerce or to use their national systems as a means to further restrict the availability of certain content to their populations. If the US wishes to avoid these outcomes, it may be necessary to allow for greater international participation in the regulation of the internet. While this naturally entails a diminishing of American control over the Net, this tradeoff is well worth if it prevents global fragmentation.

iGod?

 

The last chapter of the book arguably presents the most controversial aspect of humanity’s future relationship with the Web. Carr accurately sums up this by describing the goal of Google’s founders to “have the entire world’s knowledge connected directly to our minds.” (Pg 212). The idea of being able to plug our brains directly into the Internet raises several troubling questions. The most obvious one is whether creating devices that can transmit and broadcast signals that perfectly mimic human brainwaves could pose a threat to human safety. If we become fully capable of sending artificial brain signals, the next logical step could simply be to “program” individuals like any other operating system.

 

Even assuming that such a possibility does not occur, the melding of human and artificial intelligence raises the ultimate privacy question. As we’ve learned over the past few years, the use of the Internet comes with a price: individuals surrender a small bit of their privacy. Imagine a world where the cost of “plugging in” to the net may be to literally allow Google to know what’s on your mind. As things stand now, there are certain steps that an individual concerned about his or her privacy can take while surfing on the net. It’s hard to see how the same steps could be taken if we plugged our brains directly into the net; telling someone not to subconsciously think about certain aspects of their life while surfing hardly seems like a real solution.

Comments

[Nathan Richardson]

You make a good point that the web allows people to overcome the limitations of geography. This raises a larger point that runs against Carr (and Sunstein's) worries about balkanization of communities. Basically, the idea is that variety of experiences has a utility all its own. See the human love of travel, which is known in all cultures I am aware of. This isn't to say Carr and Sunstein's points and concerns aren't valid, just that human nature cuts the other way too. Different people have different tastes for variety, but certainly many people enjoy being exposed to different opinions, people, experiences, and cultures - then use that exposure to modify their own worldview. The internet makes this easier, just like it makes associating with only those who agree with you easier. While the net empowers one person to scrupulously avoid the "other side's" blogs, it simultaneously empowers another person to read about other cultures, talk to people around the world, buy a plane ticket, or simply read a wider variety of literature. Sure, this sounds like empty multiculturalist rhetoric, but I think there's something there.

Narrowminded people will continue to be narrowminded, regardless of whether the Internet gives them an echo chamber. There certainly was plenty of racism, nationalism, and foolishness before 1990. Similarly, openminded people will use whatever tools are available to widen their perspective - and the more tools the better.

[Nathan Richardson]

test

[Kathy Lee]

Jim, I agree with your points about balkanization. One particularly fascinating example that Carr gave was the neighborhood segregation experiment. He recounted the experiment that showed that a preference to have 50% of your neighbors be the same race inevitably results in segregation. Nevertheless I wondered whether ideological segregation would be necessarily damaging. On one hand, as you rightly point out, this leads to polarization and heightens the extremism of viewpoints. On the other hand, we might style this more optimistically as specialization. We might see this as a way to heighten and deepen ideological convictions.

Sarah Vowell has a great chapter in The Partly Cloudy Patriot where she describes how she became mobilized politically by a liberal Internet chat group that she joined while campaigning for Kerry. She protested with this group, she campaigned with this group, and she drew comfort from this group when Kerry was defeated. Her story of the heightening of ideological conviction makes it seem like the Internet might in fact restore civic virtue and keep us from becoming shallow--reduced, as Carr suggests, by the advertising pressure on news organizations to a culture of mediocrity many miles wide but only a fraction of an inch deep (157).

The example of racial segregation nags at the conscience because at its heart are irrational and deeply damaging racial divides. We might distinguish ideological divides from the deeply racialized balkanization that affected, say, the Balkans. We might appreciate the Internet's role in stripping our identities from bothersome sources of discrimination--race, gender, age, height, weight, geography. It might be useful to think about how ideological balkanization differs from physical segregation before we start worrying over it.